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ABSTRACT 
On September 28, 2000, Israel's Likud party leader, Ariel Sharon, visited the 
Temple Mount in the Old City of Jerusalem.  His visit spawned the al-Aqsa Intifada, a 
period of significant Palestinian resistance that has never “officially” ended, and whose 
reverberations continue to be felt to this day. 
This thesis assesses Israel’s counter-terror strategies and tactics during the al-
Aqsa Intifada in light of established scholarly measures of effectiveness.  It focuses on 
specific Israeli actions aimed at countering Palestinian resistance. These include: targeted 
assassinations, home demolitions, collective punishments, border controls, administrative 
detention, controls on terrorist financing and technological advances.  It assesses those 
tactics, year by year, to determine whether or not there was a correlation between the 
tactics and the number of anti-Israeli terrorist incidents.  This tactical analysis provides a 
basis on which to appraise Israeli counter-terror strategy and its long-term effectiveness.  
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This chapter begins with a summary of the origins of the al-Aqsa Intifada.  It then 
gives the purpose of this thesis research project.  Next, it offers an examination of the 
scholarly definitions of terrorism and counterterrorism and presents a literature review on 
the scholarly measures of effectiveness. It concludes with the methodology and sources 
used for this research.  
A. BACKGROUND   
  In June 2000, Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Barak and the Chairman of the 
Palestinian Authority, Yasser Arafat, met with U.S. President Bill Clinton at Camp David 
with the intention of negotiating a permanent peace accord between Israel and Palestine.  
Barak was on the verge of offering a fully independent Palestinian state to Arafat and 
returning territories Israel gained during the 1967 war.  Arafat refused to accept the peace 
offer.  Talks broke down over the issue of control of the Temple Mount in Jerusalem, the 
holist site in Judaism and third holiest to Muslims, and the right of return for Palestinian 
refugees.  On September 28, 2000, Israel's right-wing Likud party leader, Ariel Sharon, 
visited the Temple Mount in the Old City of Jerusalem.  His visit sparked the beginning 
of the al-Aqsa Intifada, a wave of civil and paramilitary resistance to the Israeli 
occupation of the West Bank and Gaza Strip. The al-Aqsa Intifada is attributed to failures 
of the 1993 Oslo Peace Accords and diplomatic break down at Camp David, which failed 
to transfer political power from the Israelis to the Palestinian Authority.  The terrorist acts 
that took place during this time period presented an impediment to peace and stability, 
and they have directly affected the military policy, training, doctrine and future planning 
of the Israeli government.   
During the al-Aqsa Intifada the Israelis developed several methods to counter 
terrorist attacks by Palestinian resistance fighters.  The Israeli government remains 
divided on the best methods to counter resistance movements by organizations in 
opposition to Israel.  Hardliners, such as former Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, 
believe that retaliations, preemptive strikes and maintaining pressure on resistance groups 
are the best method to counter terror.  Furthermore, they believe that the Israeli 
 2
government should not negotiate with terrorists.  Others have taken a more moderate and 
conciliatory approach towards terrorist organizations.  They believe that negotiations and 
economic incentives are more effective strategies.  
B. PURPOSE 
The purpose of this thesis is to analyze Israel’s counterterrorism strategy and 
tactics between 2000 and 2005 and assess their outcomes against scholarly measures of 
effectiveness.  Although the region is plagued by a perpetual cycle of violence, the Israeli 
government has successfully curtailed some terrorist activity.  This thesis analyzes Israeli 
strategies and tactics during the al-Aqsa Intifada and uses Israel as a case study for how a 
democratic country has attempted to reduce the frequency of terrorist incidents.  It 
concludes with implications drawn from Israel’s successful and unsuccessful strategies 
and tactics. 
C. DEFINING TERRORISM AND COUNTERTERRORISM 
Definitions of terrorism vary by scholar, state and institution.  Terrorism can be 
described in terms of its tactics, motivations, targets and its perpetrators.  Terrorists 
typically exploit “the fears of the civilian population, thereby undermining the 
government, compromising its alliances, and affecting the economy."1 At the tactical 
level "the opponent conducting asymmetrical warfare tries to change the course of action 
in order to prevent the achievement of political objectives."2 Those tactics often include 
guerrilla warfare, sabotage, hostage taking and terror attacks.3 The United Nations 
defines terrorism as "all criminal acts directed against a State and intended or calculated 
to create a state of terror in the minds of particular persons or a group of persons or the 
general public."4 The U.S. State Department defines terrorism as, "premeditated, 
politically motivated violence perpetrated against non-combatant targets by sub-national 
                                                 
1 Rob de Wijk, “The Limits of Military Power” in Terrorism and Counterterrorism: Understanding 
the New Security Environment ed. Russell Howard and Reid Sawyer (Guilford, CT: McGraw-Hill/Dushkin, 
2004), 485.  
2 Ibid.  
3 Ibid.  
4 Israeli Defense Forces, "IDF Doctrine" [database on-line]; available from http://www.idf.il; Internet; 
accessed 3 March 2006. 
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groups or clandestine state agents."5  Scholar Dr. Anthony James Joes describes terrorism 
as being similar to the other forms of warfare which are typically the "option of those 
who confront an enemy greatly superior in numbers, equipment, and training.”6 Although 
the definitions vary, terrorism is distinct from other forms of warfare in that its 
perpetrators typically seek to impact a government by attacking noncombatants.   
Counterterrorism can be described as the effort by governments to counter 
terrorist activity.  There is a scholarly controversy on how to categorize a government's 
counter terror actions and policies.  Scholars Ronald Crelinstein and Alex Schmid 
contend that the most common way to differentiate amongst counterterrorism response 
options is to separate them into "soft line" and "hard line" responses.  Soft line responses 
address the root causes of the terrorist activity, whereas hard line responses address the 
actions taken by the terrorist organizations.7 Crelinstein and Schmid show a second 
method of separating counter terror policies is to divide them into domestic criminal 
justice matters or treating them as an external "form of war or low-intensity conflict."8 A 
state that views counterterrorism as a criminal justice matter will target terrorists with an 
internally-focused police force.  To the contrary, a state that views counterterrorism as a 
form of war will target terrorists with a foreign-focused paramilitary organization.  In this 
regard, Israel is in a unique situation.  Most of the terrorist activity that takes place within 
Israeli borders is conducted by individuals that are neither Israeli citizens nor foreign 
fighters.  During the al-Aqsa Intifada, most of Israel’s terrorist incidents come from the 
Palestinians; a people living on Israeli territory but not apart of the Israeli nation-state.   
Several other scholars have sought to provide a framework for assessing counter-
terrorism. Christopher Hewitt lists six specific categories of counter terror policies a 
government can adopt: ceasefires, negotiations, improved economic conditions, 
collective punishments, the use of security forces and political reforms as classifications 
                                                 
5 Department of State, Office of the Ambassador-at-Large for Counterterrorism, Patterns of Global 
Terrorism 1985 (Washington D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1986).  
6 Anthony James Joes, Modern Guerrilla Insurgency (New York: Praeger, 1992), 5. 
7 Ronald D. Crelinsten and Alex P. Schmid, "Western Responses to Terrorism: A Twenty-Five Year 
Balance Sheet," Terrorism and Political Violence 4, no. 4 (Winter 1992): 310. 
8 Ibid, 310.  
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for anti-terror policies.9 Similarly, in her essay, "Institutional Responses to Terrorism, 
The Italian Case," Donatella Della Porta, uses changes "in legislation, the policy of the 
police apparatus, and the actual activities of the security forces and courts in order to 
assess a state's response to terrorist attacks.”10 She analyzes counter-terrorist strategies by 
addressing changes in government policy.  RAND scholars Bruce Hoffmann and Jennifer 
Morrison-Taw take a slightly different approach towards addressing counter terror 
strategies and policies.  Instead of listing the types of policies a government can use, they 
list four elements which are necessary for a counter-terrorist campaign to be successful.  
They assert that there must be "effective overall command and coordination structure, 
legitimizing measures must be taken by the government to build public trust and support, 
coordination between intelligence service, and foreign collaboration among governments 
and security forces."11 Their approach measures the performance of the organization 
countering terrorism as a precondition for the effectiveness of the policy.  
D. MEASURES OF EFFECTIVENESS  
Scholars and policy analysts also have debated how to measure the effectiveness 
of counterterrorist strategies and tactics. There is limited literature on the topic of whether 
or not Israel’s operations have been successful, and there are few studies with respect to 
how Israel's counter terror strategies actually rate in relation to these measures of 
effectiveness.  Furthermore, several methodological approaches have been designed to 
measure counterterrorism's effectiveness, but there is an open debate regarding which 
approach is most valid.  A recent U.S. Congressional Research Service report addressed 
the challenge of measuring effectiveness.  The author of the report stated that 
governments may place an over reliance on quantitative indicators, such as the number of 
incidents, while ignoring qualitative indicators, such as the morale of the terrorist 
organization.  The report showed that the problem with quantitative indicators is that they 
do not take into account normative data (such as the underlying sentiments of a terrorist 
                                                 
9 Christopher Hewitt, The Effectiveness of Anti-Terrorist Policies (Lanham: University Press of 
America, 1984), 35. 
10 Donatella Della Porta, "Institutional Responses to Terrorism, The Italian Case" Western Responses 
to Terrorism, eds. Alex P. Schmid and Ronald D. Crelinsten (London: Cass, 1993), 156. 
11 Bruce Hoffmann and Jennifer Morrison-Taw, “A Strategic Framework for Countering Terrorism,” 
(Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 1992), v. 
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organization).  In addition, an over reliance on quantitative indicators ignores quantum-
like changes in terrorist organizations.  The author indicated that the most important 
indications of counter terror effectiveness is measured either qualitatively or 
quantitatively: the author of the report focuses on the number of incidents, social attitudes 
and overall trends.12 Another problem when it comes to measuring counterterrorism’s 
effectiveness is with the issue of quantum changes in terrorist organizations.13 Because 
terrorist organizations often behave in a “non-linear” matter, simply doing time-series 
analyses of raw data may ignore data such as when terrorists develop radically new 
strategies and tactics.  For this reason, the report suggests tracking indications of 
“quantum” change in a terrorist organization as well. These include: intelligence, 
technology, impact on society, targets and their protection, alliances, disruption, amount 
of unproductive energy expended, sophistication of effort, and morale and momentum.14  
Radical changes in one or more of these elements may indicate a major shift in the 
capability and momentum of the terrorist organization.   
Hewitt measures counterterrorism's effectiveness using a quantitative time-series 
analysis.  According to Hewitt, if the amount of terrorist violence decreases over time 
then counter-terror policies have been successful.15  David Bonner's essay entitled 
"United Kingdom: The United Kingdom Response to Terrorism" describes four measures 
of effectiveness: the rate of prosecution of terrorist elements, overall level of terrorist 
incidents, death toll, and alterations in terrorist tactics.16 Terrorism specialist Martha 
Crenshaw offers an alternative approach, using both qualitative and quantitative 
indicators.  She argues that terrorism declines when there is "physical defeat of the  
 
                                                 
12 Raphael Perl, "Combating Terrorism: The Challenge of Measuring Effectiveness," CRS Report for 
Congress, 23 November 2005. 
13 Ibid., 7.  
14 Ibid.  
15 Hewitt, xii. 
16 David Bonner, "United Kingdom: The United Kingdom Response to Terrorism," Terrorism and 
Political Violence, 4, no. 4 (Winter 1992): 200. 
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extremist organization, a decision to abandon the terrorist strategy, and organizational 
disintegration."17 
There is limited literature on whether or not specific counter terror strategies and 
tactics have been effective in Israel.  Israeli scholar Noemi Gal-Or's essay "Countering 
Terrorism in Israel" addresses the counter terror efforts by the Israeli government.  Gal-
Or offers a history of the terrorist threat in Israel and responses by the Israeli government.  
She asserts that the impact of Israeli counter terror measures can be measured by 
empirical, political, and technical/operational criteria (i.e., negotiations and laws).  
Conversely, she shows that terrorism's impact on Israeli society can only be measured 
using socio-political criteria.18 Gal-Or also claims that the pattern of terrorist activity is 
correlated to political dynamics and counter terror measures, and she offers a qualitative 
analysis of the major anti-Israeli terrorist incidents.  Her assessment covers select 
incidents from the period of 1948 - 1987.  Gal-Or does not discusses whether or not the 
Israelis have been successful during the al-Aqsa Intifada.  
Suzie Navot's essay, "The Supreme Court of Israel and the War Against Terror" 
addresses some of the decisions made by the Israeli government to counter terrorism.  
She sets up her framework of analysis by addressing the tension between "claims of 
national security" and the "principles of human rights."19 Specifically, Navot addresses: 
targeted killings, evacuations, relocation, and legal measures.  Navot's point was to 
illustrate the legal challenges Israel faces in dealing with Palestinian terror, but in terms 
of measures of effectiveness her report did not show a correlation between government 
actions and changes in terrorist activity.   
E.  METHODOLOGY AND SOURCES  
This thesis does a comprehensive survey of Israeli counter terror strategies and 
tactics from September 28, 2000 through December 31, 2005.  This thesis analyzes 
                                                 
17 Martha Crenshaw, "How Terrorism Declines" in Terrorism Research and Public Policy, ed. Clark 
McCauley (Portland, OR: Cass, 1991), 70. 
18 Noemi Gal-Or, "Countering Terrorism in Israel" in The Deadly Sin of Terrorism, Its Effects on 
Democracy and Civil Liberty in Six Countries, ed. David A. Charters (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 
1994), 162. 
19 Suzie Navot, "The Supreme Court of Israel and the War against Terror," European Public Law 9, 
no. 3 (July – September 2003): 323. 
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Israel's specific counter terror policies against these scholarly categories in order to 
generalize the Israeli’s approach to counterterrorism.  It assesses whether or not the 
Israelis are generally “hard-liners” or “soft-liners” based on the Crelinstien/Schmid 
model, and whether they view counter-terrorism as a criminal justice matter or military 
matter.  It also categorizes the Israeli’s choices of tactics based on Hewitt and Della 
Porta’s approach, and whether or not their counter-terrorism organization is a success 
according to the approach taken by Hoffman and Morrison Taw.  It assesses data 
concerning major terrorist attacks and how government decision making and the military 
response mechanism has affected the end result.  Specifically, it looks at the range of 
Israel's counter terror policies and how they measure up in terms of both tactical and 
strategic categories and quantitative and qualitative measures of effectiveness.  This 
research borrows from the aforementioned scholarly approaches, and categorizes the 
governmental responses into quantitative and qualitative outcomes. It then analyzes the 
outcomes according to the criteria set forth by scholars and academics.  
This thesis assesses critiques of Israeli counter-terrorism tactics and strategies, 
perspectives on Israel’s achievements and failures, essays, academic studies, Israeli 
government manuals, and Israeli military documents.  Sources include books, journal 
articles, public opinion polls and magazine and newspaper articles, and public statements 
by political and military officials.  Whenever possible, this project will assess data from 
two or more sources in order to look for a general trend.  The two quantitative measures 
of effectiveness are studied: the number of terrorist incidents and the number of 
casualties.  The overall numbers of terrorist incidents are gathered from the RAND/MIPT 
terrorism knowledge base as well as the Israel Information Center for Human Rights in 
the Occupied Territories (B’Tselem).  Data concerning casualties and death tolls is 
gathered from International Policy Institute for Counterterrorism (ICT) and B’Tselem. 
Polling data is gathered from the Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research 
(PCSPR), the Jerusalem Media and Communication Center (JMCC) and the Israeli Public 
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II.  BACKGROUND ON THE PALESTINIAN RESISTANCE 
MOVEMENT 
 
Today, I have come bearing an olive branch and a freedom-fighter's gun. 
Do not let the olive branch fall from my hand. Do not let the olive branch 
fall from my hand. Do not let the olive branch fall from my hand. 
 
          - Yasser Arafat, 197420 
 
 
Once we have war planes and missiles, then we can think of changing our 
means of legitimate self defense. But right now, we can only tackle the 
fire with our bare hands and sacrifice ourselves. 
 
      - Sheikh Ahmad Yassin21 
 
A.  INTRODUCTION  
This chapter offers a background on the Palestinian resistance movement.  It 
summarizes the political history of Palestine from 1947 through 2005 and gives a 
synopsis of the major decisions made by Palestinian leaders since the UN’s partition of 
the region.  This chapter then assesses the major anti-Israeli terrorist organizations during 
the al-Aqsa Intifada and summaries their chief objectives and outcomes.  
Nearly four million Palestinian Arabs and six and a half million Israeli Jews 
currently occupy the territory that became known, after the First World War, as the 
Palestine Mandate.22  Since the reemergence of Jewish settlers to the area in the early 
20th century, there has been contention between the two groups for control of both the 
land and society. The Palestinian Arabs claim that it is their land, and they have a right to 
reject foreign occupation. Israeli Jews believe that the land is their historic home, and that 
they deserve to control it. 
                                                 
20 “The Speech of Yasser Arafat, Palestine at the United Nations,” Journal of Palestine Studies 4,  no. 
2 (Winter 1975): 192. 
21 Mia Bloom, Dying to Kill: The Allure of Suicide Terror (New York: Columbia University Press, 
2005), 3-4.  
22 CIA World Fact Book, "West Bank and Gaza Strip,” [database on-line]; available from 
http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/geos/gz.html; Internet; accessed 10 May 2006. 
 10
Since the UN’s partition of Palestine in 1947 and the establishment of Israel in 
1948, the Israelis have won wars against Egypt, Syria, Lebanon, Jordan, and Iraq but they 
continue to have an ongoing struggle with the indigenous Palestinian population.  In 
1949, after the 1948 Arab-Israeli war, Israel agreed to armistices with neighboring 
Lebanon, Jordan, Egypt and Syria. The frontier of the state of Israel agreed at this time is 
generally referred to as the “Green Line.” The Green Line has been a major source of 
contention for displaced Palestinian refugees, as well as Israeli settlers that desire to 
occupy areas outside the Green Line. 
B.  THE PALESTINIAN RESISTANCE MOVEMENT – ORIGINS AND 
ORGANIZATIONS  
The clash between the Israelis and the Palestinians is an example of sustained 
civil warfare in the form of a resistance movement, or a communal conflict.23 The 
displaced Palestinian refugee population poses grave security concerns for neighboring 
countries. Disputes over Israeli settlements in the predominately Palestinian areas of the 
Gaza Strip in the south and on the West Bank of the Jordan River are at the heart of the 
Arab-Israeli peace process. 24  
 The Palestinian resistance movement has been led by several groups. The first 
organized movement towards Palestinian nationalism came soon after Israel claimed its 
sovereignty as a nation-state. This organization, known as the Movement of Arab 
Nationalists (MAN) embraced Egyptian President Gamel Abdul Nasser’s visions of pan-
Arab Nationalism, and sought to liberate Palestine through collective, Arab action.25 
From the 1960’s through the 1990’s, the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) 
emerged as the most powerful representative of the Palestinian people.  At its core, the 
PLO's resistance efforts seek to challenge the Jewish presence in Palestine.  The 
resistance movement has a direct affect upon the region's social framework, policies and 
the Israeli government’s ability to conduct future planning.  The PLO's terrorist tactics 
                                                 
23 John Amos, Palestinian Resistance: Organization of a Nationalist Movement (New York: 
Pergamon Press, 1980), 4.  
24 CIA World Fact Book, “Israel,” [database on-line]; available from 
http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/geos/is.html#Geo; Internet; accessed 10 May 2006. 
25 Helga Baumgarten, “The Three Faces/Phases of Palestinian Nationalism, 1948 – 2005” Journal of 
Palestine Studies 34, no.4 (Summer 2005): 44.  
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exploit the fears of the Israeli civilian population as an attempt to undermine their 
government, challenge their alliances, and affect their economy.26 The tactics they 
employ often include guerrilla warfare, sabotage, hostage-taking and terror attacks.27   
 Since its founding, the PLO constantly evolved its diplomatic and military 
strategy to remain in power.  Internally, the PLO has had to contain competition from 
like-minded organizations such as Fatah and the Popular Front for the Liberation of 
Palestine (PFLP) as well as resident political elites and rival organizations like Hamas 
and Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ).  From a military standpoint, external actors categorize 
the PLO's military branches and competing rivals as terrorist organizations because their 
aims tend to be political, religious or ideological, and they promote fear by targeting non-
combatants.28 Diplomatically, the PLO has been in a quagmire.  For much of its existence 
it has operated as an exiled government.  Externally, the PLO has had to maintain 
strategic relationships with Arab neighbors, great powers, and intergovernmental 
organizations; yet, internally, they have struggled to maintain the support of the 
Palestinian people.  Furthermore, as a non-state actor, PLO members are not given 
recognition as representatives of a sovereign nation. 
1.  1964 - 1979 Towards Recognition and Legitimacy  
 The PLO was founded on May 28, 1964. Its purpose was "as a mobilizing 
leadership of the forces of the Palestinian Arab people to wage the battle of liberation, as 
a shield for the rights and aspirations of the people of Palestine and as a road to 
victory."29 The PLO was originally the idea of Nasser. He sought to use the Palestinians' 
cause to further his visions of pan-Arab nationalism.30  Led by Ahmad Shukeiri, the 
organization organized terrorist raids from the Gaza Strip and sought to undermine 
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Jordan's monarchy.31 After Israel's victory in the 1967 war, however, the Palestinians 
were less inclined to believe that Arab unity would be the key in their liberation from 
Jewish control.32  
 Following the 1967 war, there was an effort by the Palestinians to emphasize the 
importance of a Palestinian identity over an Arab identity.33 After 1967, the conflict was 
redefined by Palestinian strategists, in order to shift the focus away from Arab and 
towards Palestinian concerns.34 In 1968, the Palestinians created a national charter which 
declared Palestine as the homeland of the Palestinian people.  
 Internally, the period between 1967 and 1974 was characterized by tension 
between the exiled PLO leadership and the West Bank's local political elite.35 PLO rivals 
jockeyed for power and influence with their constituents.  In order to contain rival 
groups, the PLO sought to reduce their influence36or absorb them into the PLO's wider 
movement. The two major groups were Fatah, a secret resistance group founded in 1954 
by Yasser Arafat and George Habash's Christian-Socialist Popular Front for the 
Liberation of Palestine. In 1967 Fatah joined forces with the PLO, followed by the PFLP 
in 1968. 37  
In 1969, Arafat was elected as the PLO's third chairman, and his support of 
guerrilla warfare led to his exile from Tunisia in 1971.  His exiled status and the 
fragmentation of the PLO's leadership created obstacles towards gaining recognition and 
momentum for the nationalist movement. Arafat's main objective was to maintain control 
of the PLO and legitimize himself with the masses by developing extensive social 
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institutions, medical facilities, welfare and educational programs.38 His second objective 
was to maintain a base of operations.  Fatah's organizers believed that operating within 
Israeli controlled territories made them susceptible to Israel's intelligence network and 
effective countermeasures.39 In order to escape Israeli intelligence, Arafat operated 
outside the West Bank and Gaza Strip, yet political and military pressure from 
neighboring Arab states did not protect Fatah’s leadership or communications network. 
Instead, Arafat’s operations remained furtive and subtle.  
 This period saw a substantial progression in military strategic thought and force 
planning.  In 1965, the PLO created the Palestine Liberation Army (PLA).  Originally 
modeled after the Algerian National Liberation Front (FLN)'s conventional army, the 
PLA looked to the Algerian revolution as an example of successful guerrilla warfare.  By 
1971 the PLO's official military organization had been divided into two major factions. 
The bureaucratized faction of the PLA maintained links to Arab governments, and 
desired a more Westernized approach to military organization.  A second, subordinate 
faction, the Palestine Liberation Forces (PLF), organized into auxiliary commando 
groups.40 The PLF looked to guerrilla strategists for strategy and doctrine.  As the 
bureaucracy grew, the Vietnamese National Liberation Front (NLF)'s model for guerrilla 
warfare began to compete with the Algerian model as an example for how to fight 
revolutionary war.  The Vietnamese model was aimed at common participation in armed 
violence, where as the Algerians organized as a "closely knit cadre of revolutionaries."41 
Most of Fatah's leadership preferred the Vietnamese model of recurrent strikes designed 
at attacking enemy morale. The more revolutionary-minded PFLP did not believe the 
region’s terrain or the PLO's resources were sufficient for sustained operations. They 
preferred the Algerian approach of small-scale, efficient raids and quality operations.42  
 Arafat sided with the PFLP and chose the Algerian FLN's approach.  During the 
late 1960's and early 1970's the PLO authorized a large number of organized guerrilla 
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attacks.  Although the PLO had absorbed its two major rivals, the PFLP and Fatah, the 
organization could not contain internal competition for power and control.  In the early 
1970's the PFLP authorized the skyjacking of several commercial aircraft and joined 
more non-PLO radicals in a guerrilla campaign against the Jordanian Army.  In order to 
contain the internal rivals, PLO created its own terrorist cell, Black September.  Black 
September challenged the rivals by conducting their own spectacular terrorist attacks, 
including several skyjackings and the murder of Israel athletes at the Munich Olympics in 
1972.  
 Externally, the post-1967 Middle East was influenced by Cold War balance of 
power politics. The United States supported Israel, and the Egyptians and the Syrians 
looked to the Soviet Union for support.  In 1967 the UN issued Resolution 242, which 
called for the "withdrawal of Israeli armed forces from territories occupied in the recent 
conflict."43 The PLO expressly rejected the resolution because it did not require the 
Israelis to return all of the territory seized during the 1967 war.  
In 1974, the PLO was recognized by the Rabat Arab Summit as the "sole 
legitimate representative of the Palestinian people"44 and by the UN General Assembly as 
the principal “party in the establishment of a just and durable peace in the Middle East."45  
Throughout this period, the PLO made official statements regarding their statehood and 
sovereignty through annual meetings of their parliamentary body, the Palestinian 
National Council (PNC) and at the UN, in which it was the only non-state actor to gain 
observer status. 46 During the 1970's more nations had official diplomatic relations with 
the PLO than with Israel, and in 1976, Palestine was admitted as a member of the Arab 
League.  In 1977, during the thirteenth session of the PNC, the PLO resolved, "to pursue 
the struggle to recover our people's national rights, and first and foremost, their right to 
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return, to exercise self-determination, and to establish their independent national state on 
their own land."47 
2.  1980 - 1992 The Rise of Islamic Fundamentalism  
  By 1980, the PLO had emerged as a legitimate actor in both the occupied 
territories and a dominant force in world politics.48 Although the world recognized the 
PLO as a true authority, internally the organization faced several challenges.  Foremost 
was the problem of the PLO's continually exiled leadership.  This prevented the PLO 
from directly pursuing operations against the Israelis and maintaining a day-to-day 
presence with the Palestinian people. A second problem was the tension created by the 
PLO's presence in Lebanon and Jordan. Arafat maintained legal bases of operation in 
both countries, but waves of Palestinian refugees strained the two nations both 
economically and politically. 
 By the early 1980's, the PLO appeared to be developing into a "regular" army.49 
The PLO also instituted a system of ranks, modern organizational units and combat 
doctrine.  By 1982 the PLO had acquired a significant inventory of both light and heavy 
weapons. These included assault rifles, machine guns, anti-tank weapons, armored 
vehicles, howitzers, multiple-rocket launchers, personnel carriers and missile launchers.50 
PLO members were also reported to have trained on Mig-23 and Mig-21 jet fighters in 
Libya.51 Yet, in terms of force planning, the PLO's military doctrine was mainly reactive 
and defensive. Despite substantial growth, the Palestinian military lacked the capability 
to resist a modern conventional force.  Their primary tactic was to launch rocket attacks 
or guerrilla raids into Israel's northern settlements. The PLO lacked complete operational 
control over its competing organizations and rival factions; the dispersed militia was 
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spread between multiple urban centers with "virtually no localized centralized 
command."52  
 In June 1982, the Israelis launched a full-scale invasion into Lebanon. The "first 
aim of Sharon's plan was to destroy the PLO's military infrastructure in Lebanon and to 
undermine it as a political organization."53 Operationally, the PLO demonstrated a lack of 
command and control during the invasion.54 Furthermore, its "regular" army organization 
did not match its revolutionary aims, which rendered the heavy weapons ineffective.55 
After an intense bombing campaign and occupation, by September 1982 nearly all of the 
PLO's leadership had been evacuated from their stronghold in Beirut.  
 After the Lebanese conflict, Arafat was exiled to Tunis.  Arafat maintained 
control of the PLO through a series of deft political maneuvers.  Externally, he faced 
pressure from his Arab neighbors. The Syrians attempted, unsuccessfully, to "set up a 
puppet Palestinian organization."56 In order to balance Syrian antagonism, Arafat looked 
to Jordan for support.  In February 1985, Jordan's King Hussein and Arafat announced a 
joint policy designed to establish a Palestinian state on the West Bank of the Jordan 
River.  In November 1988, under Arafat's direction, the PNC proclaimed the 
establishment of an independent Palestinian state.57 
 Within Palestine, a new politically elite class sought to counterbalance the PLO's 
dominance in the region. These elite emerged out of a middle-class religious movement. 
With origins in the doctrine of Muslim Brotherhood, the faction sought to revitalize 
Islamic values into the everyday life of the Palestinian people.  In a general sense, the 
faction was apart of a broader movement, which the West has termed "Islamic 
fundamentalism."58 The fundamentalist movement gained significance in the 1970's59 
                                                 
52 Saygih, 17.  
53 Avi Shlaim, The Iron Wall: Israel and the Arab World (New York: W.W. Norton & Co., 2001), 
396.  
54 Saygih, 18.  
55 Ibid., 24.  
56 Bickerton, 227. 
57 Ibid., 233.  
58 Frederick Mathewson Denny, An Introduction to Islam (Upper Saddle River, NJ: Prentice Hall, 
2006), 187. 
 17
which may have been due to the concurrent resurgence in Christian fundamentalism in 
the West and a coincident decline in the secularism of the modern nation-state.  This 
movement included ideas about "jahiliyya, of the indivisible sovereignty of God, and the 
duty of jihad (struggle) to restore the shari'a (Islamic law) to its rightful place in 
society."60 Most of the movement's religious scholars believed "the only authentic source 
for survival, let alone revival, of Islam was the Qur'an."61 Within Palestine, the two 
central parties that developed out of the Islamic fundamentalist movement were Hamas 
and Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ).  Like their contemporaries across the Middle East, 
these organizations fused religion and politics together.  During the first Intifada, in the 
late 1980's, Hamas and PIJ resorted to violence to achieve their goals.  Due to their exiled 
status, the PLO found it difficult to control the fundamentalist factions, and increasingly, 
Hamas and PIJ competed with PLO-sanctioned military actions.   
 During the 1980’s the Middle East was subject to the ripple effects of a declining 
Soviet Union.  The waning Soviet empire looked to the United States for support, and 
sought to distance itself from the radical Arab regimes it had propped up in the past.62 
U.S. policy makers backed Israel, authorized financial support for Egypt and protected 
the oil-rich countries of Saudi Arabia and Kuwait.  The United States also supported the 
settlement of Soviet Jewish immigrants to Israel.  With only one superpower on the 
scene, the PLO worked through the UN to condemn Israel's oppression and insist upon a 
plan for peace.  From a diplomatic standpoint, the PLO’s efforts were effective. By the 
mid-1990's more states recognized the PLO's declaration of independence than 
recognized Israel's right to exist.63  On the other hand, the PLO had little control over the 
internal politics of the West Bank and Gaza strip during their exile. The surge in Islamic 
fundamentalism, competition for power, and new rivals such as Hamas and PIJ 
drastically altered the capability of the PLO to execute a single military strategy.  
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3.  1993 - 2000   Failure of Oslo and the al-Aqsa Intifada    
 During the 1990's Arafat once again emerged as the authoritative voice of the 
Palestinian people.64 In 1993, the PLO began a series of secret meetings with the Israeli 
government 65 and, under U.S. President Bill Clinton; the Americans resumed the role of 
Middle East peace broker.  In September 1993, Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin and 
Arafat signed letters of mutual recognition and an interim peace agreement known as the 
Oslo Accords. The peace accord envisioned a timeline and plan for Israeli forces to 
withdraw from the West Bank and Gaza Strip and the Palestinians to control public order 
and security.66 The agreement also mandated that the Israelis would maintain 
responsibility for defending the region against external threats, and that the Palestinian 
National Authority (PA) would be held responsible for preventing acts of violence by 
Palestinian militants.  The Oslo process depended upon the “formula of peace-for-
security.  That is, the process would continue as long as the Palestinian Authority cracked 
down on terrorism and other political violence directed at Israel and the Israelis residing 
in the territories.”67  
Following the peace accords, the PA became the officially recognized 
administrative body for the Palestinian people. The PA was designed to provide internal 
oversight of the West Bank and Gaza Strip, and their main objective was to create police 
and security forces.  Arafat’s PLO remained in control of foreign relations and the PLA.  
 This year also marked a new era within Israel; the first suicide bombing within 
Israel’s borders by an anti-Israeli, Palestinian organization.  On April 16, 1993, a member 
of the Hamas organization blew up his car next to an Israeli bus parked near a settlement 
in the Jordan Valley.68  Between April 16, 1993 and the beginning of the al-Aqsa 
Intifada, there were sixty one suicide terror attacks within Israeli territory.69 During this 
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period only two groups, the Islamic-fundamentalist groups Hamas and PIJ, conducted 
suicide attacks.  
 After the Israeli-PLO peace accord was negotiated, Arafat returned to Palestine.  
Upon his return, Arafat and the exiled leadership of the PLO once again faced resistance 
from the resident governing elite, now in the form of radical Islamic factions, as well as a 
movement within his own Fatah party called “tanzim.”  Tanzim’s cadre had maintained 
Fatah’s political and military base during their exile.  With Arafat’s return, this group 
“led the crusade against general corruption, mismanagement and lawlessness of the PA’s 
governance”70 and alienated Arafat’s core support base. This period saw a notable 
increase in the rivalry between Fatah and Hamas for control of the PA.  The widening 
gulf between the secular-nationalist Fatah and the religious-Islamic elites under Hamas 
severely impacted Arafat’s strategy to maintain power.71 Arafat’s disillusioned and 
fragmented Fatah party was wed to the tenets of the Oslo Accords, whereas rival parties 
had the flexibility to promote their own, more radical, agendas.  
 During the 1990’s, Hamas’s growing strength and popularity began to diminish 
Fatah’s legitimacy as the sole representative of the Palestinian people.  In 1994, the PA’s 
chief economic advisor, Ahmed Qurei, announced that Fatah was bankrupt.72 The 
financial crisis forced Arafat into a cycle of less than ideal courses of action.  In order to 
remain in power, Arafat had to seek aid from outside sources. The West was willing to 
negotiate, but only if he enforced the provisions agreed to at Oslo.  Each concession 
Arafat made to the West furthered Fatah’s alienation from the Islamist factions. 
 In 1994, Rabin was assassinated by a right-wing Israeli radical that opposed the 
signing of the Oslo Accords.  After Rabin’s death, the position was filled by Shimon 
Peres, who was voted out of office only one year later and replaced by the right-wing 
Benjamin Netanyahu.  Netanyahu’s tenure in office saw the expansion of Israeli 
settlements into the West Bank and a significant decrease in Palestinian suicide 
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bombings.73 The Israeli political electorate shifted back to the left in 1998 with the 
election of Ehud Barak.  Barak initiated a follow-on round of negotiations with the 
Palestinians. In July 2000, Barak, Arafat and Clinton met at Camp David to negotiate a 
permanent peace accord. The talks broke down over the issue of who would control the 
Temple Mount, the right of return of Palestinian refugees, and territorial concessions. At 
one point during negotiations, Barak conceded the Palestinians full control over the Gaza 
Strip, most of the West Bank and custodial sovereignty over the Temple Mount.74 Arafat 
would not negotiate until the Palestinians were guaranteed full control of the West Bank 
and Gaza Strip.  He also refused to allow the Israelis control over the Temple Mount, 
which is not only the holiest site in Judaism, but is also on the land that surrounds the al-
Aqsa Mosque, the third holiest site in Islam.  
 On September 28, 2000, Likud party leader Ariel Sharon visited the Temple 
Mount in an effort to show its significance to Judaism.  His visit spawned the beginning 
of the al-Aqsa Intifada, a wave of resistance to the Israeli occupation of the West Bank 
and Gaza Strip and response to the mounting frustration over the failure of the Oslo 
Accords and break down at Camp David.  That year, the Israeli electorate shifted once 
again, and in January 2001, Sharon took office as Prime Minister.   
The al-Aqsa Intifada is marked by a significant increase in the number of suicide 
attacks against Israeli non-combatants and support for those attacks by Palestinian public 
opinion.75 Furthermore, during the al-Aqsa Intifada, the Palestinians were exposed to 
multiple attacks against known PLO leaders and the assassination of dozens of suspects 
affiliated with Hamas, the PIJ, Fatah and the PFLP. 76 In return, these groups responded 
with violent counter-attacks and suicide bombings.  
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C.   MAJOR ANTI-ISRAELI TERRORIST ORGANIZATIONS DURING THE 
AL-AQSA INTIFADA  
During the al-Aqsa Intifada, the resistance movement against Israel was led by 
several organizations that have been, or are currently listed on the U.S. State 
Department's index of terrorist organizations.  The major groups include, but are not 
limited to: the PFLP, Hamas, PIJ, the al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigade (Fatah's militant branch) 
and Hezbollah.  The tactics and goals of these groups vary.   Occasionally these 
organizations work together to carry out an attack.  Some of the groups are rivals of each 
other.  
1. Characteristics and Tactics of the Anti-Israeli Palestinian Terrorist 
Organizations  
 The central characteristic shared by each of these groups, is a willingness to 
target non-combatants.  The Israeli Institute for Counterterrorism reports that although 
there have been more Palestinian than Israeli causalities during the al-Aqsa Intifada, as of 
March 2003 nearly 70% of the Israeli fatalities were non-combatants as opposed to only 
16.6% of the Palestinian causalities.77 Another characteristic shared by each of these 
organizations is a propensity to use suicide tactics as a method of terror and destruction.  
Suicide tactics were used extensively by the Lebanese Hezbollah following the 1982 war 
with Israel.  Hezbollah was successful at embracing the growing radicalization of Islam 
and turning the Shiite notion of martyrdom “into the doctrinal template for a general 
mobilization against social injustice.”78  Two decades later, during the al-Aqsa Intifada, 
each of these groups has embraced Hezbollah’s methods of suicide terror. The Journal of 
Palestine Studies reports that there were 219 Palestine suicide attacks (bombing and non-
bombing) from September 2000 through September 2004.79  Of the 219 attacks, 135 were 
suicide bombings and 84 were non-bombing suicide attacks. The non-bombing suicide 
attacks included infiltrations and attacks with small arms.   
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 From an economic point of view, suicide terror is a rational default for 
organizations that lack a formal military infrastructure.  Sources disagree about the cost 
of conducting a suicide attack.  Some claim one mission costs as little as $150, where as 
others claim it could cost anywhere from $3,500 to $50,000.80  At any rate, the cost is 
substantially less than maintaining a robust military capability or modern armed force.  
For non-state actors, like the Palestinian political factions, suicide bombing and terror 
tactics are economically rational alternatives to raising an armed force. The cost of a 
suicide attack being not only substantially less than the cost of an armed force, but also 
an effective tactic for killing a great number of people. According to the RAND/MIPT 
terrorism knowledgebase, the total number of terror attacks in Israel and the Occupied 
Territories from 2000 to 2005 was 2,345.81  These attacks killed a total of 1,260 people. 
The knowledgebase shows that there were 141 suicide bombing attacks in Israel and the 
Occupied Territories from 2000 – 2005, killing 705 individuals.  While only accounting 
for 16.6% of the terrorist incidents during this timeframe, suicide bombers were 
responsible for over half of the deaths due to terrorist incidents.82 On average, five people 
died for every one attack.  
Of the 2,345 terrorist incidents in Israel and the Occupied Territories from 2000 - 
2005, the top five anti-Israeli terrorist organizations only claimed responsibility for 797.  
The remaining incidents were not claimed by any organization, but most are attributed to 
one of the top four or five anti-Israeli terrorist organizations.  Nearly two-thirds of the 
claimed attacks were from Hamas.  Fatah and the al-Aqsa Martyr’s Brigade claimed 
responsibility for over 18% of the attacks, PIJ accounted for nearly 13%, the PFLP 
accounted for 5% and Hezbollah accounted for less than 1%.   
Although suicide attacks have claimed the greatest percentage of terrorist 
incidents within Israel, several of these organizations have also perpetuated a “war-like” 
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stance against the Israelis through the use of conventional arms. The number of mortar 
and rocket attacks increased significantly, from only four rockets fired and 512 mortar 
shellings in 2001, to 232 rockets fired and 1139 mortar shellings in 2004.  
 
Figure 1.  Mortar and Rocket Attacks during "Ebb & Flow" 2001 - 2004(information 
from the Israeli Defense Force, 2004)83 
 
2.   Ideology and Actions of the Major Anti-Israeli Palestinian Terrorist 
Organizations, 2000 – 2005  
a. Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP) 
The PFLP is best known for a series of airline hijackings throughout the 
1960's and 1970's, but during the al-Aqsa Intifada the organization was a relatively minor 
player in the resistance movement.84 Since PFLP’s founding in 1967, 40% of its targets 
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have been against private citizens or property.85 Currently, the PFLP has approximately 
800 members and, like Arafat’s Fatah party, the group maintains a nationalist-separatist 
ideology, but with a Marxist-Leninist social doctrine.  PFLP leaders also rejected the 
tenets of the Oslo Accords because Arafat recognized Israel’s right to exist.  
In 2001, Israeli security forces fired a missile into the Palestinian 
controlled city of Ramallah in the West Bank.  The attack killed the PFLP’s Secretary 
General, Abu ‘Ali Mustafa.  After his death, the military wing of PFLP was given his 
namesake.86 In retaliation for the death of their Secretary General, the PFLP assassinated 
Israel’s minister of tourism, Rehavam Ze’evi.87 After Ze’evi’s death “the Israeli security 
cabinet approved Sharon’s request to launch ‘all-out war on the terrorists, those who 
collaborate with them, those who send them’”88  The Israelis also began to hold the PA 
more responsible for the actions of terrorist organizations operating within the Occupied 
Territories.  
In January 2002, a part of an effort to crack down on anti-Israeli militants, 
the PA arrested the PFLP's new Secretary General, Ahmad Saadat, and four other ranking 
members of the organization.  This action strained the relationship between Arafat’s 
Fatah party members and PFLP’s leaders89 as well as the disconnect between the PA’s 
actions and Palestinian public opinion.  During the al-Aqsa Intifada, the number of 
bombings conducted by the PFLP rose sharply in relation to its other tactics: 
assassination and armed attacks, however, the total number of incidents conducted by the 
PFLP remained relatively low compared to the other anti-Israeli organizations.  In 2003 
the number of bombings and assassination attempts fell, only to sharply rise again in 
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2004 and 2005 after Saadat’s arrest.  The number of bombings increased significantly, 
from only one in 2003 to 15 in 2005.  


























Figure 2. Number of Terrorist Incidents by Category, PFLP 2000 – 2005 (from the 
RAND/MIPT database, 2006) 
 
b. Harakat al-Jihad al-Islami al-Filastini, Palestinian Islamic 
Jihad (PIJ) 
In 1987, PIJ formed as an offshoot of Muslim Brotherhood.  PIJ espouses 
a Sunni religious ideology, and has been closely associated with Hamas.  The group’s 
central leadership resides in Syria and Lebanon and has fewer than 1000 members.  PIJ 
has conducted numerous shooting attacks and suicide bombings against Israeli citizens, 
and since its founding, 71% of PIJ attacks have been against private citizens or 
property.90 It is estimated that PIJ receives approximately $2 million from Iran annually91 
and continuous logistical support from Syria.  From 2000 to 2004, the PIJ increased its 
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number of lethal strikes, and the group tends to rely upon suicide bombing and attacks 
with firearms.92 In April 2004, PIJ worked in conjunction with Hamas to attack IDF 
soldiers in the Gaza Strip.  In May, the IDF retaliated by destroying between 80 and 120 
homes of homes of suspected PIJ and Hamas members.93  The next year there was a 
remarkable increase in the number of PIJ-related bombing incidents against Israeli 
targets.  In 2005, the number of bombings had increased to 45, up from only four in 2004.  




























Figure 3. Number of Terrorist Incidents by Category, PIJ 2000 – 2005 (from the 
RAND/MIPT database, 2006) 
 
c.  Fatah and the al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigade  
The al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigade is a secular, nationalist-separatist 
organization that formed in 2000.  Since its inception, 95% of their attacks have been 
against private citizens or property.94 The al-Aqsa Marytrs Brigade is closely linked to 
Arafat’s Fatah party, which provides most of its financing. In 2002, the number of 
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terrorist incidents attributed to Fatah and the al-Aqsa Martyr’s Brigade spiked. That year 
Arafat is reported to have issued a statement urging the Palestinians to “comply with its 
decision to refrain from carrying out any operation against Israeli civilians inside Israel 
[emphasis added] even if they were in reprisal for the crimes of the occupation against 
Palestinian civilians.''95 Fatah was unsuccessful at preventing Hamas or PIJ from 
continuing terror attacks and accept a cease-fire agreement with the Israelis.  
Contradicting their policies, later that year Fatah’s leadership adopted suicide bombing as 
a "legitimate tactic in its strategy.'96 Because of this, Arafat was perceived by the Israeli 
government as either not being able to control his people or playing a "dual game." 
Furthermore, the Israeli government found it difficult to negotiate with Arafat on 
conditions for a ceasefire.97 In January 2002, over 50 tons of weapons and explosives 
aboard the Karine-A freighter were seized by Israeli forces. The freighter was believed to 
be of Iranian origin, and destined to supply Fatah with enough explosives and rockets to 
“the potential to imperil every city in Israel.”98 The affair resulted in a diplomatic 
severance between the United States government and the PA.  One month later, Israeli 
Prime Minister Sharon visited the White House, and President George Bush issued the 
following public statement,  
Mr. Arafat has heard my message.  I can't be any more clear about it, that 
he must do everything in his power to reduce terrorist attacks on 
Israel.  And that -- at one point in time, he was indicating to us that he was 
going to do so, and then all of a sudden, a ship loaded with explosives 
show up that most of the world believes he was involved with.99 
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From that point forward, the United States government, as well as the 
Israeli government, held Arafat responsible for the violence perpetrated by all anti-Israeli 
Palestinian terrorist organizations.  Terrorist incidents attributed to Fatah and the al-Aqsa 
Martyr’s Brigade declined significantly in 2003, but resurged once again in 2004 and 
2005.   


























Figure 4. Number of Terrorist Incidents by Category, Fatah 2000 – 2005 (from the 
RAND/MIPT database, 2006) 
 
d.  Harakat al-Muqawamah al-Islamiyya (Hamas) 
Hamas formed in 1987 as an offshoot of the Sunni-dominant Muslim 
Brotherhood.   Literally meaning “zeal” in Arabic, Hamas opposes the recognition of 
Israel as a state and urges a radical Islamic jihad.  Although Hamas views the Israeli 
problem as primarily religious, part of their strategy is purely social; the organization 
advocates spreading knowledge about Israeli’s oppression though mosques and 
educational institutions.  Hamas also places an emphasis on “social solidarity” and has 
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capitalized upon a number of charitable organizations, wealthy donors and state-sponsors 
to build up extensive social services.100 
Since Hamas’s founding, 84% of their attacks have been against private 
citizens or property.101 Hamas defines Israel and Western colonialism as “the enemy” of 
the Palestinian people.  Hamas leaders have continuously stated that they deny Israel’s 
right to exist, and has refused to negotiate with the “Zionist” state.  
Since 1993, Hamas has been a staunch opponent of the Oslo peace 
process, and led the Palestinian resistance movement during the al-Aqsa Intifada in both 
the number of successful attacks and the number of murdered Israelis.  In order to entice 
potential suicide bombers and terrorists, Hamas’s cadres have promised monetary 
rewards and financial incentives to martyrs and their families. The Israeli government has 
reported that “families of Hamas activists killed or wounded while carrying out terror 
attacks – and those imprisoned for their involvement in such attacks typically receive an 
initial one-time grant of between $500 and $5000, as well as a monthly allowance of 
approximately $100.”102  
It is estimated that Hamas’s budget ranges from $30 million to $90 million 
per year.103  Hamas receives most of its funding from Iran, but its constituency is actively 
involved in garnering financial support from charitable organizations, state-sponsors and 
wealthy individuals.  The organization also receives funding from the mosques, hospitals 
and social institutions they support and protect.  During the al-Aqsa Intifada, Hamas 
offered medical support and assistance to Palestinian non-combatants caught in the 
crossfire and left unaided by the bankrupt PA.  During this period Hamas’s popular 
support increased dramatically because they could be relied upon to bring relief and aid 
to desperate Palestinian citizens.  
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From 2000 through 2005, Hamas's military branch, the Izz al-Din al-
Qassam Brigades, conducted assassinations, kidnapping, firebombing, arson and property 
damage, as well as mortar shellings and Qassam rocket attacks on Israeli citizens.104 
Hamas also authorized shootings, suicide bombings and standoff mortar-and-rocket 
attacks against Israeli military targets.105  The incident that killed the most Israelis during 
the al-Aqsa Intifada was a Hamas suicide bomber that killed 30 Israelis “at a Passover 
meal in Netanya on 28 March 2002.”106 In 2004, the number of terrorist incidents 
conducted by Hamas against Israeli targets increased over three-fold from the previous 
year.  This increase came primarily from a sharp rise in the number of bombings directed 
at Israeli non-combatants.  In 2003, Hamas claimed responsibility for 32 bombings, 
where as in 2004, they claimed 198.107   























Figure 5. Number of Terrorist Incidents by Category, Hamas 2000 – 2005 (from the 
RAND/MIPT database, 2006) 
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e.  Hezbollah  
Hezbollah literally means “party of God” in Arabic. The organization 
formed in 1982, and its main base of operation is in southern Lebanon.  Hezbollah is a 
radical, Shiite organization, aimed at the destruction of Israel.  Its primary sources of 
financing come from Iran and Syria.  Hezbollah is categorically unique from the major 
Palestinian resistance groups in that it operates from outside of Israel and the Occupied 
Territories.  Since its founding, only 7% of Hezbollah’s attacks have been targeted 
against private citizens or property.108  Hezbollah is credited with reintroducing suicide 
bombing as a terror tactic when they directed a major attack against American and French 
peacekeeping forces in Beirut in 1983, and continued to target the IDF in southern 
Lebanon.109  “Lebanese Hezbollah had forced Israel to leave Lebanon by using suicide 
bombers; the same tactic would now be applied in the al-Aqsa Intifada.”110 Unlike the 
other anti-Israeli terrorist organizations, most of Hezbollah’s targets are either military or 
diplomatic.111  Hezbollah is also well known for "its skill at manufacturing and placing 
sophisticated roadside bombs."112 As Hamas does in the West Bank and Gaza Strip, 
Hezbollah provides extensive social services and pubic welfare projects for the residents 
of southern Lebanon.  Although Hezbollah was not a directly responsible for a wide 
number of terrorist incidents during the al-Aqsa Intifada, the organization is credited with 
providing indirect financial, logistical and intellectual support to the Palestinian 
resistance movement.  Hezbollah backed a number of terrorist incidents, and without 
their contributions, many of the incidents could not have taken place.   
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D.  CONCLUSION  
For the duration of the Palestinian resistance movement, the outcome of the 
Palestinian leadership’s decision-making was governed by a complex process of 
interrelated objectives.  Overtime, and especially throughout the 1980’s and 1990’s, the 
tension between secular movements and the Islamic fundamentalist organizations created 
chaos and a lack of control over political outcomes.  This tension was only exacerbated 
by the continuous ousting of Palestinian leadership.  During the al-Aqsa Intifada, the 
secular-nationalist Fatah party and the Islamic-fundamentalist Hamas and PIJ factions 
continued to jockey for control of Palestinian public opinion. The lack of control over 
internal decision-making has been perceived by the Israelis the Palestinians’ inability to 
govern their own people, when in actuality, frustrated Palestinians simply sought political 
control over the Israelis as well as themselves.  
During the al-Aqsa Intifada, the top four anti-Israeli terrorist organizations 
contributed to a significant proportion of the terrorist incidents within Israeli territory.  At 
times, these groups competed with each other over the number of terrorist incidents they 
could impose on the Israeli people.  By group, Hamas caused the greatest number of 
incidents, followed by Fatah, PIJ and the PFLP (Figure 5).  Hezbollah has contributed to 
the funding of many of the incidents, but was not held directly responsible for any 
significant events during the 2000 through 2005 timeframe.  
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Figure 6. Number of Terrorist Incidents in Israel by Year and Organization September 

































III.  ISRAELI STRATEGIES AND TACTICS DURING THE AL-
AQSA INTIFADA 
What is at stake today is nothing less than the survival of our civilization.  
      - Benjamin Netanyahu113 
 
A.  INTRODUCTION  
This chapter describes strategies and tactics used by the Israelis to counter 
terrorist activity during the al-Aqsa Intifada.  It opens with a background on Israel’s 
comprehensive defense strategy and the Israeli government’s philosophy on 
counterterrorism technique and practice.  In terms of tactics, this chapter addresses the 
Israeli polices of  targeted assassinations, home demolitions, collective punishments, 
administrative detention and prosecution, border controls, technological advances, and 
controls on terrorist financing.  It concludes with a generalization of Israeli 
counterterrorist efforts in terms of official policies, authorized actions and organizational 
effectiveness. 
In order to survive as a nation-state, the Israelis have developed a distinctly 
aggressive defense posture. In order to prevail, the nation seeks to avoid war by political 
means and a credible deterrent posture, to prevent escalation, to determine the outcome of 
war quickly and decisively, and to keep casualties low.114 The nation has a two to three 
year mandatory conscription for all citizens (male and female) aged 18 and over.  
Citizens remain in reserve status for 25 years after their service obligation has been 
fulfilled, and in essence, nearly the entire country could be mobilized for war.  
Furthermore, the Israelis have built a social structure upon which there is “extensive 
participation of civilians in the military effort.”115 Thus, the civil-military relationship in 
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Israel is intertwined in such a manner that it has become an attribute of the Israeli 
national character.116  
 The Israelis have developed a number of strategies and tactics to counter the 
Palestinian resistance movement and terrorist threats from outside organizations.  One of 
the basic tenets of Israeli military doctrine is that the Israeli Defense Force (IDF) is 
postured to combat terrorism.117 Israel's perception of the Palestinian resistance 
movement is that some organizations loyal to the Palestinian nationalist movement or in 
opposition to Israel in general are conducting "terrorist" attacks.   
At the strategic level, the Israelis exhibit three central characteristics.118  First, the 
Israelis maintain a position of strength.  This is typically characterized by a robust 
defense capability and military infrastructure.119 The Israelis have also built a system of 
"passive" defense. This involves the "extensive use of watchmen and undercover security 
personnel, careful scrutiny of all individuals approaching likely targets. . .on-site security 
systems, and heightened alertness of the civilian population."120  The nation’s perimeter 
defense system includes fortified outposts, minefields, and IDF patrols along 
transportation routes.121 The nation’s passive defense also includes an extensive network 
of human intelligence (HUMINT).  This network of spies and collaborators provides 
early warning to the IDF on potential attacks.122 Second, the Israelis maintain constant 
pressure on terrorist organizations.  From a military standpoint, the pressure typically 
comes in the form of frequent air raids and ground attack operations.  Last, the Israelis 
have a history of only coming to the bargaining table when the terrorist elements are in a 
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weakened state.123 Consequently, the Israeli leadership tends to negotiate with the 
Palestinians only after a series of IDF counterattacks.   
At the tactical level, official Israeli policies vary.  Several of the tactics used by 
IDF soldiers and security police are condemned by the international community because 
of their severity.  The most common Israeli tactics during the al-Aqsa Intifada included 
targeted assassinations, the demolition of Palestinian homes in the West Bank and Gaza 
Strip, administrative detention, border control mechanisms, defensive technological 
advances and controls on terrorist financing.   
B.  ISRAELI TACTICS  
1. Targeted Assassinations 
  Israel has a long history of state-authorized, targeted assassinations.  Dozens of 
militants and innocent bystanders have been killed in this way since 2001, when Israel 
first officially acknowledged its "liquidation" of terror suspects as a state policy.124  
During the al-Aqsa Intifada, Israeli military forces killed dozens of suspected terrorists 
affiliated with Hamas, the PIJ, Fatah, and the PFLP.125 The exact data on the number of 
Palestinians that have been assassinated varies by source.  According to the Journal of 
Palestine Studies, during the first four years of the al-Aqsa Intifada, the Israelis 
assassinated a total of 273 individuals and killed an additional 170 bystanders during 
assassination attempts.126 The Israeli human rights organization, B’Tselem, reported that 
from 29 September 2000 through 14 March 2006, 338 Palestinians were killed during the 
course of a targeted killing while only 215 Palestinians were the actual subject of a 
targeted killing.127 According to the Journal of Palestine Studies, by group, during the al-
Aqsa Intifada the IDF killed 119 Hamas members, 96 affiliated with the al-Aqsa Martyr's 
Brigade or al-Fatah, 35 PIJ members and 23 from either the PFLP, PA intelligence or 
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another affiliation.128 The U.N.’s Human Rights Watch estimates that in 2005, over 20 
Palestinians were killed in assassinations or extra-judicial killings.129  
In August 2001, IDF used Apache helicopters to kill PFLP leader Abu ‘Ali 
Mustafa.130  The attack was a direct response to a Palestinian attack on IDF soldiers in the 
Gaza Strip, and the PFLP’s purported history of car bombings and armed attacks in the 
West Bank.  After Mustafa’s death, the PFLP renamed its military branch in honor of the 
slain leader, and retaliated by killing the Israeli minister of tourism.  Mustafa’s death was 
the first assassination of a major Palestinian leader during the al-Aqsa Intifada.  His death 
marked a series of Palestinian retaliations, and Israeli counterattacks on high-profile 
Palestinian leaders.  
During the next two years, the Israelis continued to assassinate lower-level 
members of terrorist organizations. The next major attack on a Palestinian core leadership 
was took place in 2003. In September of that year, Israeli F-16's dropped a quarter-ton 
bomb in the Gaza Strip, trying to target Hamas founder Sheikh Ahmad Yassin.131 This 
incident was perceived to be a retaliation for a Hamas attack on a ship in the Israeli port 
of Ashdod.  Hamas’s attack, funded by Hezbollah, killed 10 Israeli civilians, but was 
designed with the intent to kill several hundred more.  The incident provoked the Israeli 
government into targeting all of Hamas’s leadership.  In March 2004, Yassin and seven 
others were killed when an Israeli helicopter launched Hellfire missiles into the al-Sabra 
neighborhood in Gaza City.132  The next month, Israeli security forces killed Hamas's 
spiritual figurehead Abdel Aziz Rantisi.133 In September 2004, Hamas political official 
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Izz al-Din al-Sheikh Khalil "was killed in a bomb blast in his car in Damascus."134  Later 
that year, the IDF also killed prominent Hamas political and military leaders: Mahmud 
Zahar,135 Imad Abbas 136 and Adnan al-Ghoul.137  
Israel’s policy of targeted assassinations has come under severe scrutiny by 
Human Rights Watch and Amnesty International.  Moreover, scholars and Arab 
politicians have also denounced the West’s support of Israel, despite the Israeli 
government’s refusal to abandon the policy.  The assassinations have not thwarted 
number of attacks by the host organizations, nor do they have history of ending the 
terrorist organization’s existence.  To the contrary, the attacks may have provoked an 
even stronger response by Palestinian terrorist organizations.   
2.  Home Demolitions and Collective Punishment  
 Since the beginning of the al-Aqsa Intifada, Israel has responded to Palestinian 
attacks with several large-scale military operations designed to destroy homes and places 
of business.  Part of those operations included incursions into the Gaza Strip and West 
Bank to destroy the homes of families of suicide bombers. The program also included 
imposed closures and curfews as well as random checkpoints in Palestinian-controlled 
areas.   
The first major military operation designed at curtailing Palestinian terror attacks 
was launched in March 2001.138 Code named "Operation Bronze," the plan was designed 
to bulldoze Palestinian land, quarantine "troublesome" areas, restrict Palestinian 
movement and strengthen Israeli settlements.139 From February 2002 through October 
2004, the IDF conducted 13 major operations and incursions into Palestinian population 
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centers.  The military endeavors were designed to demolish terrorist infrastructures in the 
West Bank and southern end of the Gaza Strip near Egypt.140  During the operations the 
IDF destroyed hundreds of homes, businesses, agricultural lands and roads.   
 The actual number of homes that have been demolished is disputed.  According to 
the Israeli Information Center for Human Rights in the Occupied Territories, from 
October 2001 through January 2005 "Israel demolished 668 homes in the Occupied 
Territories as punishment."141 In contrast,  the United Nations Human Rights Watch 
(HRW) and the Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East 
(UNRWA) estimates that from 2000 - 2004 the Israeli military demolished over 2,500 
Palestinian homes in Gaza Strip alone.142  In economic terms, the total Palestinian losses 
from the damage are estimated to be between $3.2 billion and $10 billion.143  
 Israel has also used a tactic of "collective punishment" in order to retaliate against 
Palestinian terrorists.  According to the United Nations, collective punishment involves 
being "punished for an offense. . .not personally committed"144 and "collective penalties 
and likewise all measures of intimidation or of terrorism are prohibited."145 In response to 
a terrorist attack during the Israel Passover holiday in 2002, the IDF launched a 
"collective punishment" code named Operation Defensive Shield.  Operation Defensive 
Shield involved the mass arrest of suspected terrorists from the West Bank towns of 
Bethlehem, Jenin, Nablus and Ramallah.  Many of the suspects were then held in military 
prison camps or detainment facilities without trial.   
While issuing the collective punishments, the Israelis have also killed numerous 
non-combatants.  On September 29, 2004, the IDF launched a three-week incursion into 
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the Gaza Strip designated Operation Days of Penitence.146 According to the Israelis the 
operation was a response to a Qassam rocket attack against the Israeli city of Sderot.147  
Hamas purported that the Israeli operation was designed to kill Palestinians in the Gaza 
Strip, and that they did not launch any Qassam rocket attacks until October 7, 2004 after 
nine days of resistance.148 During the operation, Hamas claims to have killed 41 Israelis 
by Qassam rocket attacks.149  The IDF is estimated by the MIPT Terrorism knowledge 
base and Hamas to have killed 132 Palestinians150  but of the 132, only 68 were believed 
to be members of a terrorist organization.151  
 Israel's home demolition policies and collective punishments are in violation of 
international law.  According to Article 33 of the Fourth Geneva Convention, Israel is 
prohibited from destroying Palestinian property.152 Furthermore, Article 53 states that 
"any destruction by the Occupying Power of real or personal property belonging 
individually or collectively to private persons…is prohibited."153  In 2005, the Israeli 
Minister of Defense announced the "cessation of punitive house demolitions" 154 but 
thousands of Palestinians were still left without a place to live. This policy has also 
exacerbated the refugee problem, and it causes economic hardship on the countries that 
accept Palestinian refugees. The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 
(ICCPR) and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights prohibits the detention of  
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individuals without trial; therefore the Israel government’s mass arrest of suspected 
terrorists is also a clear violation of customary international law.  
3.  Administrative Detention and Prosecution  
 According to Amnesty International, administrative detention "is a procedure 
under which detainees are held without charge or trial.  No charges are filed, and there is 
no intention of bringing a detainee to trial."155 The Israelis have a policy of administrative 
detention in order to curtail terrorist attacks.  Amnesty International reports that, as of 
March 14, 2006, over 600 Palestinians were  being administratively detained.156  "Most 
of them are held in military camps such as the Ofer Military Camp, the Ansar 3 Ketziot 
Military Camp157 and the Megiddo prison camp.158  Until recently, most of the detention 
camps were being run by the IDF.159  There have been also reports that the prisoners are 
not being held in accordance with international legal standards.  Moreover, the Israeli 
Information Center for Human Rights in the Occupied Territories has documented 
several cases of abuse and torture.160  
 In terms of how to treat detainees, the UN has developed an international standard 
in its Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or 
Punishment (CAT).  The CAT was ratified by Israel 1991.161  This treaty states that “no 
exceptional circumstances whatsoever, whether a state of war or a threat of war, internal 
political instability or any other public emergency, may be invoked as a justification of 
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torture.”162 In terms of prosecution, some legal scholars argue that terror suspects should 
be denied habeas corpus.  Others claim that no individual should be denied the right to a 
fair trial.  The UN has also developed an international standard in regards arrest and trial. 
ICCPR states that, "no one shall be subjected to arbitrary arrest or detention." Further, the 
ICCPR states that, "anyone arrested or detained on a criminal charge shall be brought 
promptly before a judge or other officer authorized by law to exercise judicial power and 
shall be entitled to trial within a reasonable time or to release."163 The Israelis ratified the 
ICCPR in 1992.164 Israeli standards at the detention camps and the denial of habeas 
corpus have the nation in violation of several international legal standards.  To the 
contrary, the UN has not instituted a legal consensus on what precisely constitutes 
torture.  This gap allows the Israelis to claim that they are following their own 
interpretation of the law.  According to Israeli domestic law and the law applying to the 
Occupied Territories, "administrative detention is lawful."165  The Israelis claim that 
suspects are taken to a judge within eight days of arrest, and a judge then decides whether 
or not to prolong the detention.166  
4.  Border Controls  
 The Israelis have been reluctant to negotiate on the status of their borders.  This is 
due to several religious, military and economic reasons. The Israelis claim a religious 
affiliation with the Holy City of Jerusalem as well as the surrounding territory.  For 
religious reasons, they believe that they have a legitimate claim to rule over the land.  The 
Temple Mount in Jerusalem is the holiest site in Judaism and the entire region has 
historical significance to the Jewish people.  
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From a military standpoint, loosing control over any border puts the small nation 
into a vulnerable position.  For instance, relinquishing the Golan Heights to neighboring 
Syria could jeopardize the Israelis' ability to conduct an early-warning system against a 
surprise attack.  The nation has built radars on Mount Hermon, the highest point in the 
Golan Heights region. "If Israel withdrew from the Golan and had to relocate these 
facilities to the lowlands of the Galilee, they would lose much of their strategic 
effectiveness."167 From a military point of view, the West Bank is important because of 
its central location.  If Israel were to completely surrender the West Bank to the 
Palestinians, it would limit the Israelis' access to the Jordan River and drastically reduce 
the nation's constricted width.  The Gaza Strip is important because of its proximity to the 
Egyptian border.  The Israelis believe they need control of the area in order to curtail 
arms trafficking and weapons distribution to militant Palestinian organizations.168 Israeli 
access to the Gulf of Suez in the south is a strategic military and economic position. From 
an economic point of view, Israel’s desire to control the headwaters of the Jordan River 
in the north has been source of tension for its neighbors.   
 The Israelis are world renowned for their border control inspectors, agents and 
their ability to manage the movement of individuals, conveyances and vehicles inside 
their territory.  One border control mechanism the Israelis have implemented as a result 
of the al-Aqsa Intifada is a wall along the Green Line that separates the West Bank from 
the rest of Israel.  First proposed in June 2002, the wall was designed to curtail the ability 
for suicide bombers to come into Israel from the West Bank.  It was also designed to help 
the Israelis find a way to "keep a Jewish majority within its borders."169 The border 
mechanism was intended to “be a combination of fences, walls, ditches, patrol roads and 
electronic surveillance devices."170 The wall has carved off about 2% of the West Bank 
from the Palestinian side of the Green Line.  According to the World Bank, this land 
                                                 
167 Jewish Virtual Library, "Defensible Boundaries," [database on-line]; available from 
http://www.jewishvirtuallibrary.org/jsource/Peace/Boundaries.html; Internet; accessed 12 March 2006.  
168 Moshe Sharvit, "The Military and Security Implications of Israel's Disengagement from the Gaza 
Strip," Strategic Assessment 8, no. 3 (November 2005): 9.  
169 David Makovsky, "How to Build a Fence," Foreign Affairs 83, no. 2 (March/April 2004): 50.  
170 "Israel building fence along the West Bank,” CNN, June 18, 2002 [online news]; available from 
http://archives.cnn.com/2002/WORLD/meast/06/17/mideast/; Internet; accessed 12 March 2006. 
 45
contained approximately 16 Palestinian villages and 12,000 residents.  Thus, the wall 
traps Palestinians between Israeli territory and the Green Line, it restricts freedom of 
movement, and it annexes Palestinian lands and water resources.171   
 Another border control mechanism is a policy of restricted zones.  In March 2002, 
following an escalation of Palestinian violence, the IDF turned many West Bank towns 
into "restricted military zones, with residents under sustained curfew for days at a 
time."172  The economic affect was daunting- "all non-humanitarian goods had to be off-
loaded from incoming trucks and re-loaded onto local trucks at eight checkpoints near 
major West Bank cities."173 This took additional time and manpower.  The restrictions 
also applied " more rigorously to manufacturers and traders attempting to move goods out 
of Palestinian cities than to those bringing goods in from Israel."174  The checkpoints 
restrict the freedom of movement from homes to places of work, and force the 
Palestinians to rely upon the Israeli security guards for passage into other areas.  
5.  Technological Advances  
 Not all of the Israelis' counter-terror measures have been offensive in nature. 
There are a number of technological advances the Israelis have made in countering 
terrorism in a defensive manner.  Northrop Grumman developed a Mobile Tactical High-
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rockets fired from inside Lebanon.175  During the M-THEL's testing phase, it shot down 
25 Katyusha rockets before they hit their targets.176   
 Israeli scientists have also proposed technological initiatives to track the 
movement of cargo and the entry and exit of individuals.  Israel has adopted biometric 
passports which "free travelers from the need for a signature and identifying themselves 
with an electronic chip."177 Israeli scientists have also developed devices that can identify 
an explosive commonly used by bomb makers.  The device can detect a chemical 
component common in bombs developed by Palestinian terrorists.  The U.S. government 
has done extensive work with the Israelis in testing the explosive trace detection 
technology.  The Israelis have successfully implemented the explosive trace detection at 
border checkpoints to thwart potential terrorist attacks by suicide bombers.   
6. Controls on Terrorist Financing  
 A second defensive measure at countering terrorist activity is to "constrict the 
operating environment in which terrorist raise funds."178 Terrorist financing typically 
comes from charitable donations or state sponsors.  In order to coerce the PA into 
submission, in 2002, Sharon began restricting the amount of tax revenue they received 
back from the Israeli government.179 The Israeli government also increased the tracking 
on terrorist financing and each organization's access to economic resources.  In 2002, the 
IDF "hauled tons of documents from Palestinian government offices, homes, businesses, 
and local charities, and then shared the papers with other governments and media."180 The  
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documents revealed "a sophisticated financial infrastructure that reached from Saudi 
Arabia to Ramallah via Europe and the United States."181  
Due to the complexity of terrorist financing, controlling it requires extensive 
involvement with other nations.  For instance, in 2003 the United States and several 
European countries froze the assets of a Hamas front organization, the al-Aqsa 
International Foundation, because it was funding Palestinian resistance fighters.  
Furthermore, a number of charities and companies are under investigation in the United 
States and Europe for their suspected involvement in funding Palestinian 
organizations.182 State support of terrorist organizations is more difficult to control.  
Some nations simply provide safe havens or logistical support to terrorist enclaves.  
Others give direct funding.183  Most of the funding for anti-Israeli terrorist organizations 
comes from Iran.  It has not been possible for the West to negotiate with the Iranian 
regime, thus anti-Israeli terrorist organizations have had unrestricted access to their 
funds.  
C.  ISRAELI STRATEGY  
1.  General Policy and Outcomes   
Israel's counter-terrorist policies can be categorized as a hard-line, and a form of 
war.  Israel's policies do little to address the "root causes" of terrorist activity.  Instead, 
the Israeli government takes a proactive stance in response to terrorist activities.  The 
Israeli strategy throughout the al-Aqsa Intifada has been an “ad hoc” approach, and 
retaliatory method of responding to the terrorist threat using the IDF and launching a 
series of military operations.   
The Israeli government has implemented a number of specific policies designed 
to counter terrorist activity.  The Israeli government has instituted the use of security 
forces and moderate political reforms.  To the contrary, the Israelis have done little in the 
way of ceasefires, negotiations or improving economic conditions.  There has been little 
done in the way of official ceasefires or negotiations during al-Aqsa Intifada because the 
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PA's leadership is unable to control the terrorist factions and Israeli policy makers do not 
negotiate with terrorist organizations.   
The economic conditions in the Occupied Territories are grim.  After the outbreak 
of the al-Aqsa Intifada, economic development plans for the West Bank and Gaza Strip 
that were conceived during the Oslo peace process were hindered by Israeli security 
procedures.184 According to the World Bank, from 2000 to 2003 the Palestinian 
population increased from 3.1 million to 3.4 million.  On the contrary, gross national 
product (GNP) decreased from $5.2 billion to $3.8 billion.  Gross national income (GNI) 
per capita decreased from $1,750 to $1,120 over the same period.185  
The Israelis have made several legal changes during the al-Aqsa Intifada.  In 
terms of changes in legislation, the Israel court approved a governmental policy to 
transfer family members of those involved in terrorism from the West Bank to the Gaza 
Strip.186 The Israelis also adopted a Civil Torts (Liability of the State) Law, where 
Palestinians who live under "Israeli military occupation in the West Bank and Gaza Strip 
are considered residents of a "conflict zone." As such, they are denied the right to claim 
liability for death, injury, or damage to property inflicted on them by Israeli forces."187  
2.  Organizational Effectiveness  
One method of measuring a government’s effectiveness is to assess, "overall 
command and coordination structure, legitimizing measures must be taken by the 
government to build public trust and support, coordination between intelligence service, 
and foreign collaboration among governments and security forces."188 This approach 
measures the performance of the counter-terrorist organization as a precondition for the 
effectiveness of a specific policy. 
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In terms of bureaucratic competence, the Israeli government has demonstrated 
superior organizational effectiveness.  The Israelis have instituted a parliamentary 
democracy, which operates under a unicameral legislature and a Prime Minister.  The 
Israelis have a functioning command and coordination structure, which acts to detect, 
track and preempt attacks. The Israelis also have one of the most sophisticated armed 
forces in the world.  In 2005 the Israeli government spent approximately 7.7% of its GNP 
($9.45B in defense spending).189 The Israelis are world renowned for the effectiveness of 
their intelligence services, their foreign collaboration among governments and their 
ability to exploit human intelligence and disseminate that information amongst all their 
security services.  
In terms of legitimizing measures taken by the government to build public trust 
and support, the Israelis have not demonstrated the same amount success as they have in 
other areas.  In order for a state that in order for a government to build public confidence 
in counter-terror activities, ‘legitimizing’ measures must be taken. These include 
measures such as, “political concessions to ethnic or religious minorities, economic 
measures to ameliorate housing and employment inequities or deficiencies; [and] 
defensive steps to protect the public from terrorist reprisals.”190 These measures “deprive 
the terrorists of their legitimacy, undermine their claims as a viable alternative to the 
government, negate popular support or sympathy for the terrorists, [and] redress popular 
grievances that may directly fuel unrest or be exploited for antigovernment purposes.”191  
D.  CONCLUSION  
During the al-Aqsa Intifada, Israeli tactics and strategies varied.  Several of the 
Israeli tactics were in clear violation of international law.  Amnesty International and the 
UN Human Rights Watch Commission have condemned the Israeli government for their 
practices of detaining suspected terrorists without trial and demolishing the homes of 
Palestinian civilians in the Gaza Strip.  On the other hand, Israeli defensive 
countermeasures, such as biometrics and high-energy lasers, are some of the most 
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sophisticated and advanced pieces of technology in the world.  Israel’s overall 
counterterrorism strategy during the al-Aqsa Intifada was organized, sophisticated and 
well-monitored.  The Israelis have put a great deal of effort into their counterterrorism 
program, and are likely to continue to do so into the future.  
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IV.  MEASURES OF EFFECTIVENESS 
Granted mobility, security (in the form of denying targets to the enemy), 
time, and doctrine (the idea to convert every subject to friendliness), 
victory will rest with the insurgents, for the algebraical factors are in the 
end decisive, and against them perfections of means and spirit struggle 
quite in vain.  
- T.E. Lawrence, 1920192 
A. INTRODUCTION  
 This chapter gives a background on the general methodological approaches which 
have been designed to measure counter-terrorism’s effectiveness.  It then uses the Israeli 
case to measure their government’s effectiveness during the al-Aqsa Intifada.  First it 
assesses three qualitative measures of effectiveness.  These include: the overall number 
of terrorist incidents, a quantitative assessment suicide bombers that were apprehended 
by Israeli defense or security forces before they acted and injury and fatality rates.  The 
next section looks at three qualitative indicators of government effectiveness. These 
include: social attitudes in Palestine and Israel, decisions by the terrorist organization to 
abandon their strategy, and alterations in terror tactics.  This chapter concludes with an 
assessment of whether or not the Israelis have been successful or unsuccessful at their 
counterterrorism efforts according to quantitative and qualitative indicators.  
B.  BACKGROUND   
Several methodological approaches have been designed to measure counter-
terrorism's effectiveness, but there is an open debate regarding which approach is most 
valid.  A November 2005 U.S. Congressional Research Service report addressed the 
challenge of measuring effectiveness.  The author of the report states that governments 
may place an over reliance on quantitative indicators to access effectiveness, while 
ignoring qualitative indicators.193  The report shows that the problem with quantitative 
indicators is that they do not take into account normative data (such as the underlying 
sentiments of a terrorist organization).  Quantitative indicators also fail to capture the 
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asymmetry of terrorist attacks. For instance, the volume of attacks may decrease, but the 
number of people killed may still be disproportionately large. Furthermore, an over 
reliance on quantitative indicators ignores quantum-like changes in terrorist 
organizations.  On the other hand, qualitative indicators are difficult to measure and may 
not be as reliable or precise.    
C.  QUANTITATIVE INDICATORS OF EFFECTIVENESS 
1.  Overall Level of Terrorist Incidents  
The reliance on quantitative indicators is apparent in the scholarly literature on 
general measures of effectiveness.  Intuitively, quantitative indicators are a logical 
method of determining whether or not terrorist incidents have increased or decreased, and 
are a first resort to determine whether or not counterterrorist measures have been 
successful.  Quantitative indicators can be used to measure counterterrorism's 
effectiveness using a time-series analysis.194 According to some researchers, if the 
amount of terrorist violence decreases over time, then counterterrorism policies have 
been successful.   Taking this approach, and looking at the Israeli situation from 2000 
through 2005, there have been "ebbs and flows" in the number of general terrorist attacks, 
but the overall number of attacks has gone down since peaking in 2002.  According to the 
MIPT terrorism knowledgebase, there were 19 incidents in 2000, 85 in 2001, 108 in 
2002, 75 in 2003, 30 in 2004 and 76 in 2005 (Figure 6).  The year 2002 saw the greatest 
number of terrorist incidents, followed by a decline in 2003 and 2004, and a slight rise 
again in 2005.  
Looking at the number of terrorist incidents, year by year, suggests that the 
Israelis may have implemented some effective countermeasures in 2003 and 2004, but 
that those measures were no longer as effective in 2005.  On the other hand, it is difficult 
to ascertain whether or not the Israelis have been actually effective or not by simply 
looking at the data.  This is because, although the number of actual incidents has varied, 
it is impossible to know how many incidents were actually stopped before the incident 
took place. For instance, the as a total percentage of terrorist attacks, in 2005 the Israelis  
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may have thwarted a greater number that year than in 2004, although the total number of 
incidents that year increased.   
 
Figure 7. Total Number Terrorist Incidents in Israel by Year, 2000 – 2005 (data compiled 
from the MIPT Knowledge Base, 2006) 
 
The data on attempted and thwarted terrorist attacks is limited; however, the 
journal Terrorism and Political Violence kept a record of the number of attempted attacks 
by Palestinian suicide bombers from September 2000 through May 2004.  According to 
the journal, there were 274 attempted terrorist attacks during this timeframe. Out of the 
274 attempts, only 142 actually blew themselves up.  The remaining 132 bombers were 
captured by Israeli security personnel before they acted.195 Likewise, the IDF made a 
direct correlation between their military operations Defensive Shield and Determined 
Path, taken in March/April 2002, and the immediate decrease in the number of successful 
terrorist attacks.  The IDF also believes that their security barrier in the West Bank also 
may have been tactical success at thwarting suicide operations by Palestinian terrorists.   
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After the initial construction of the fence began, the number of suicide attacks intercepted 
by the IDF increased and the number of victims of suicide attacks decreased (Figure 7).    
 
 
Figure 8. Suicide Attacks: Quarterly Perpetrated vs. Thwarted Attempts October 2000 - 
November 2004 (information from the Israeli Defense Force, 2006) 196 
 
2.  Injuries and Fatalities  
A second quantitative indication of whether or not a counter-terrorism strategy or 
policy has proven successful is a decline in the number of casualties and death rate due to 
terrorist incidents.  The Israeli Information Center for Human Rights in the Occupied 
Territories (B’Tselem) shows a similar pattern in the frequency of Palestinian attacks on 
Israeli civilians that resulted in a death.  B’Tselem’s data shows that, in total, 662 Israeli 
                                                 
196 Israeli Defense Forces, "\Suicide Attacks: Quarterly Perpetrated vs. Thwarted Attempts " 
[database on-line]; available from http://www.idf.il; Internet; accessed 3 March 2006. 
 55
citizens were killed by Palestinian terrorists from September 29, 2000 through December 
31, 2005.197  The Center’s reports show that there were 151 Israeli civilian deaths in 
2001, 272 in 2002, 129 in 2003, 69 in 2004 and 41 in 2005.  To the contrary, the MIPT 
Terrorism knowledgebase shows there were 110 fatalities due to a terrorist incident in 
2001, 329 in 2002, 174 in 2003, 65 in 2004 and 27 in 2005.  Although there is some 
variation in the numbers, the databases show a similar pattern. The number of Israeli 
fatalities due to terrorist incidents peaked in 2002, and continued to decline over the next 
three years.  The MIPT terrorism knowledgebase also shows a similar patter in the 
number of Israeli injuries due to terrorist incidents. The number of injuries peaked in 
2002, followed by a sharp decline during the next three years.  
Buy simply looking the time-series, quantitative analysis of fatalities and injuries; 
it appears that whatever strategies the Israelis were using, they were effective. The 
number of fatalities and the number of injures due to terrorist incidents declined.  
Moreover, these numbers continued to decline in 2005, even though there was an 
increase in the number of terrorist incidents that year.   
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Figure 9.  Number of Israeli fatalities and injuries due to terrorist incidents, January 2001 
- December 2005 (information from the B'Tselem Israeli Information Center for Human 
Rights in the Occupied Territories and the MIPT Terrorism Knowledgebase, 2006) 
 
A decline in the number of injuries or fatalities will not necessarily correspond to 
a decline in the overall number of terrorist incidents, as one incident may injure a wide 
number of individuals.  For this reason, in order to assess counterterrorism’s 
effectiveness, one may also look at “the number of deaths related to the number of 
incidents.”198 Using that approach, and assessing the four major anti-Israeli terrorist 
organizations during the al-Aqsa Intifada (Hamas, PIJ, Fatah and the PFLP), there is a 
remarkable decline in the average number of fatalities per terrorist incidents in Israel over 
the 2001 through 2005 time period. The ratio of fatalities to incidents for each of the 
major terrorist organizations peaked in 2002, and each declined significantly in the years 
following (despite increases in the number of incidents during the same period). This data 
suggests that the Israelis have not only been the volume of attacks, but indicates they may 
have been able to thwart the effectiveness of the attacks.   
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Figure 10. Ratio of Israel Fatalities to Terrorist Incidents in Israel by Year and 
Organization, January 2001 – December 2005 (information compiled from the MIPT 
Knowledge Base, 2006) 
This data shows that Hamas, the leader the anti-Israeli terrorist organizations in 
the number of attacks it conducted during the al-Aqsa Intifada, was also the most 
effective.  In 2002, Hamas killed an average of 10.2 Israelis per terrorist incident, where 
as the average number of deaths per incident for all anti-Israeli terrorist organizations that 
year was roughly seven.  From 2001 through 2005, Hamas killed an average of 5.58 
Israelis and injured an average of 27.3 per terrorist incident. This compares to an overall 
average of 4.36 Israeli deaths and 22.5 injuries per terrorist incident over the same period.   
D.  QUALITATIVE MEASURES OF EFFECTIVENESS 
A second major category in terms of analyzing a nation’s counter-terror methods 
is to assess measures of effectiveness from a qualitative point of view.  Due to the nature 
of these types of indicators, they are difficult to quantify.  Qualitative measures of 
effectiveness include normative social behaviors, attitudes and perceptions of 
organizational disintegration.    
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 1.  Social Attitudes  
Social attitudes can be assessed by looking at the “negative psychological or 
behavioral impact of terrorism on a society, loss of public confidence in governments, or 
in their security measures, and the degree to which terrorists are able to radicalize and 
polarize.”199 The JCSS’s public opinion data is available for the 2000 through 2003 time 
period. The Jerusalem Media and Communications Center (JMCC) and the Palestinian 
Center for Public Policy and Survey Research (PCPSR) have collected data regarding 
general Palestinian attitudes and trends during the al-Aqsa Intifada, and their data is 
available for the timeframe between 2000 and 2005.  
 Two questions that JMCC has asked the Palestinians consistently during the 2000 
through 2005 timeframe include: “In general how optimistic or pessimistic do you feel 
towards the future?” and “Do you strongly support, somewhat support, somewhat oppose, 
or strongly oppose the continuation of the al-Aqsa Intifada in the West Bank and Gaza 
Strip?” Overtime, there were only slight variations in the ways the Palestinians responded 
to the questions.  According to the data collected by the center, the Palestinians felt the 
most pessimistic about the future in December 2003.  They felt the most optimistic about 
the future in December 2005, but the data was relatively unchanged.  Palestinian 
responses to the second question also varied, but over time, support for the al-Aqsa 
Intifada waned slightly and opposition slightly increased. On the other hand, according to 
PCPSR, there was a dramatic shift in Palestinian public support of the groups conducting 
the terrorist incidents.  Palestinian public support for the more radical Islamic political 
parties, Hamas and PIJ, was approximately 17% in 2000, before the al-Aqsa Intifada. 
That figure increased to 35% by the summer of 2004.200 During that same period, support 
for Arafat's secular Fatah party decreased from 37% to 28%.201 This suggests that during 
the al-Aqsa Intifada the Islamist groups gained more legitimacy and popular support with 
the Palestinian masses.  
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 During the first three years of the al-Aqsa Intifada, the JCSS tracked 
several Israeli social attitudes. These include, but are not limited to: policy statements by 
Israeli political figures, Israeli opinions on the likelihood of war and peace, the mood 
over public safety, opinions on the condition of the country, and general agreements 
regarding peace treaties.  Like the data on Palestinian public opinion, much of the Israeli 
public opinion remains unchanged during the first few years of the al-Aqsa Intifada. For 
instance, the JCSS’s data shows that in 2001, 60% of Israelis believed a Palestinian state 
would be established within the next five years.  That number only increased by one 
percentage point by 2003.202 Similarly, Israeli attitudes regarding perception of public 
safety and bureaucratic competence only vary by a few percentage points during the first 
few years of the al-Aqsa Intifada. On the other hand, Israeli public opinion shows a large 
shift in how they view government policy in the Occupied Territories.  In 2002, 57% of 
Israelis thought government policy was “too soft;” 9% thought it was “correct” and 34% 
thought it was “too harsh.” One year later, only 29% thought the policy was “too soft;” 
13% thought it was “correct” and 58% thought it was “too harsh.”203  This shows that, 
within a one year period, nearly one-quarter of the Israeli population shifted to believe 
their government’s policy in the Occupied Territories was “too harsh.”  In these surveys, 
the second largest shift came in Israeli public opinion when asked whether or not the 
peace process should be abandoned even if it might lead to war.  In 2000 this figure was 
24%; by 2002 this number had gone up to 27% and fell to 18% by 2003.  In a one year 
period, between 2002 and 2003, nearly one in 10 Israelis changed their mind on the issue 
of whether the peace process should be abandoned.  More believed that it should not be 
abandoned.   
2.  Alterations in Terror Tactics  
One method of determining whether or not counter-terror measures have had an 
impact on an organization is to look for alterations in terrorist tactics.  A change in tactics 
indicates organizational adaptation or adjustments.  According to the RAND/MIPT 
database, the proportion of terrorist attacks on Israeli targets from 2000 through 2005 
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altered significantly.  The number of armed attacks and assassinations peaked in 2002, 
where as the number of bombings increased eight-fold over the same period.    This could 
indicate that bombings were successful; therefore they became more popular as a terror 
tactic.  It could be also an indication that the other methods were costly, or difficult to 
implement, or that the Israelis became successful at thwarting armed attacks, 













Figure 11. Major Terrorist Incidents in Israel by Tactic, 2000 – 2005  
(Information complied from the information from the MIPT Knowledge Base, 2006) 
 
3.   Organizational Disintegration  
 Counterterrorism policies that are successful at the tactical level often have a 
negative long-term impact at the strategic level.  One way to measure whether or not a 
counter-terror policy has been effective is to look at whether or not the targeted 
organization still has the “ability to attain its stated political ends."204 A second method 
along this line of reasoning  is to assess whether or not there has been a "physical defeat 
of the extremist organization, a decision to abandon the terrorist strategy, and 
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organizational disintegration."205 By this measure of effectiveness, the Israelis have not 
been successful because none of the major terrorist groups were completely destroyed.  
To the contrary, despite several years of collective punishments, administrative 
detentions, targeted assassinations and home demolitions, Hamas, Fatah, PIJ, the PFLP 
and Hezbollah continue to conduct routine attacks against Israeli citizens.  
E.  CONCLUSION 
It is difficult to state whether or not the Israelis’ counterterrorism strategies and 
tactics, as a whole, have been successful or unsuccessful.  The quantitative and 
qualitative measures of effectiveness indicate several trends.  First, the overall number of 
terrorist incidents peaked in 2002, and declined during the next three years. The overall 
number of terrorist incidents by terrorist organization also peaked that year.  Injury and 
fatality rates also follow the same trend line.  Both peaked in 2002, and declined 
thereafter.  Israeli defensive measures, like the wall, appear to have thwarted a large 
number of attacks, but it did not prevent the Palestinians from attempting to carry out an 
attack. To the contrary, 2003 saw the greatest number of attempted attacks.  
In terms of qualitative measures, during the al-Aqsa Intifada Palestinian public 
opinion shifted in favor of the more radical, Islamic organizations.  Likewise, during this 
timeframe, there were no solid decisions by the terrorist organizations to abandon their 
strategies.  This indicates that the organizations did not disintegrate, but that they remain 
active. Israeli public opinion remained relatively unchanged, but a significant proportion 
of the Israelis believed that their government’s actions were “too harsh.” The al-Aqsa 
Intifada also saw significant alterations in the tactics used by the terrorist organizations.  
Bombing and suicide-terror increased as tactics, although overtime those tactics became 
relatively less effective.   
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V. ANALYSIS AND IMPLICATIONS 
For these two forces are mutually reproductive; their interaction as endless 
as interlocked rings. Who can determine where one ends and the other 
begins?           
               - Sun Tzu206 
 
A.  INTRODUCTION  
This study offered a comprehensive survey of Israeli counter terror strategies and 
tactics from September 28, 2000 through December 31, 2005.  It then analyzed Israel's 
specific strategies and tactics against scholarly measures of effectiveness in order to 
generalize the Israeli approach to counterterrorism. The analysis done in this case study 
revealed that the Israelis are generally “hard-liners” when it comes to their counter terror 
strategy.  Instead of looking at “root causes” they  tended to respond to actions taken by 
the terrorist organizations with counterattacks.  The Israelis typically view 
counterterrorism as a military matter, and they have an “ad-hoc” approach towards their 
military planning.  This study also assessed data concerning major terrorist attacks and 
how government decision making and the military response mechanism has thwarted 
potential attacks.  Specifically, it looked at the range of Israel's counter terror policies and 
how they measure in terms of both tactical and strategic categories and quantitative and 
qualitative measures of effectiveness.  This study found that the number of terrorist 
attacks, as well as the number of Israeli causalities and fatalities peaked in 2002.  The 
number of attacks fluctuated over of the next three years, however; the number of Israeli 
casualties and fatalities both decreased over the same period  
B.  FINDINGS  
During the al-Aqsa Intifada, the Israelis used a broad range of tactics and 
strategies. The Israeli case offers several insights regarding counter-terror strategy and 
tactics.  Due to the scope, intensity and length of the al-Aqsa Intifada, a study of the  
 
 
                                                 
206 Sun Tzu, The Art of War, trans. Samuel B. Griffith (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1971), 92. 
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Israeli’s strategies and tactics would be a valuable to any other government involved in 
countering terrorist threats, guerrilla or subversive war or sustained, unconventional 
warfare.  
At the tactical level, the Israelis can provide some insights with regard to 
countering a resistance movement.  Israel’s border controls and offensive operations 
appear to have limited the number of suicide bombers that were able to carry out an 
attack.  Barriers between regions and security checkpoints are often effective in the short 
run.  The lessons learned in Israel may be applied in other regions.  For instance, U.S. 
forces are struggling to counter the terrorist threat from radical Islamic organizations like 
al-Qaeda.  From a strategic point of view, the sectarian violence in Iraq and Afghanistan 
does not match the Israeli-Palestinian model.  Iraq and Afghanistan are also much larger 
territories, and U.S. forces, for the most part, are not indigenous to those areas.  On the 
other hand, there are some tactical similarities between the two situations.  Iraqi 
resistance forces are fighting from urban centers, and by relying on suicide bombings and 
improvised explosive devises their actions do have some semblance to the tactics used by 
the anti-Israeli terrorist organizations.207 Policy makers and government officials could 
benefit from research on defensive measures such as technological initiatives, like the 
explosives detection portals developed by General Electric and Smiths Detection.208  
Advances in technology, such as the M-HETL, explosive trace detection and biometrics 
may also prove to be effective tactics, in the short run.   
C.  POLITICAL CONSEQUENCES  
During the al-Aqsa Intifada, Hamas led the Palestinian resistance movement in 
terms of the volume of attacks, and the number of Israelis they killed. In 2006, the 
political party Hamas won a majority 74 out of 132 parliamentary seats in the PA's 
                                                 
207 Council on Foreign Relations, "Iraq: Quelling the Insurgency (23 September 2004),” [database on-
line]; available from http://www.cfr.org/publication/7635/; Internet; accessed 8 March 2006. Kenneth 
Katzman is quoted as stating that "The insurgency is now driven mainly by Islamists. There are some 
foreign fighters, but the engine of this is Iraqi Islamists mirroring the tactics of al Qaeda, Hamas, and 
Hezbollah.” 
208 Glenn Johnson, interview by author, transcript, Monterey, CA, 5 April 2006. MAJ Glenn Johnson 
is in the U.S. Army's Special Forces.  He worked with the U.S. government's Technical Support Working 
Group, explosive subdivision.  
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parliamentary elections.209  The political success of Hamas was a strategic 
accomplishment for the organization; it legitimized their claims as representatives of the 
Palestinian people and brought international attention to their victory.  Hamas’s victory 
also marked the triumph of Islamic fundamentalism over national-secularism.  Hamas is 
now demonstrating many state-making characteristics that the PLO once held:210  war 
making (demonstrated in armed resistance against rival organizations), state making (in 
terms of social services provided to the Palestinians), protection (as shown in the 
protection of the Palestinian people against Israeli aggression) and the extraction of 
monetary resources though international financing, charitable donations and terrorist 
networks.  
The Palestinians’ move away from a secular-nationalist ideology and towards one 
that promotes jihad, is a dangerous situation for the Israelis.  As a radical Islamist 
organization, Hamas's 2006 political victory constitutes one of the biggest obstacle to 
peace in the region.  Not only has Islamic fundamentalism's growth and radicalization 
presented one of the most significant challenges to modernity and globalization, as well 
as the social order established democratic countries, but it has undermined the spread of 
secularization and modernity.  Hamas has refused to accept the preeminence of the PA in 
decision making.211 As a terrorist organization, the main difficulty for the newly elected 
Hamas government will be in dealing with Western policy makers. The Hamas 
government faces grim political consequences, as many Western democracies also adhere 
to a doctrine of not negotiating with terrorists.  In doing so, they are inclined to cut off 
economic aid and political support to terrorist regimes.  In Palestine, this many only serve 
to intensify, and further radicalize, the resistance movement.  
                                                 
209 Aaron D. Pina, "Fatah and Hamas: The New Palestinian Factional Reality,"  CRS Report for 
Congress, 3 March 2006.  
210 Charles Tilly, “War Making and State Making as Organized Crime,” in Bringing the State Back In 
eds. Theda Skocpol, et. al. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985), 181. In this article Tilly lists 
several characteristics of a "state." Tilly shows that a state typically engages in: war making, state making, 
protection and extraction.  
211 Samah Jabr, "New Hamas Government Trumps Old PLO," Washington Report on Middle East 
Affairs 25, no. 4 (May/June 2006): 13 – 14. 
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D. CONCLUSION  
As the Israelis have shown, short term tactical effectiveness does not solve the 
root causes of the terrorist problem. When thwarted, terrorist organizations will look for 
an alternate means of attacking a superior power.  Israeli's two most extensive military 
operations, Defensive Shield and Determined Path, appeared to be tactically successful 
because of the subsequent reduction in the frequency of Palestinian attacks.  On the other 
hand, while the measures that the IDF took were mostly designed to counter suicide 
bombers, the number of mortar and rocket attacks from the West Bank increased over the 
same period.  This may have been because the suicide attackers were being thwarted, so 
an alternate method of attack was implemented.  Likewise, in 2004, the IDF targeted a 
significant proportion of Hamas’s core leadership.  Despite the loss of their top leaders, 
Hamas won political elections only two years later.  Israeli actions during the al-Aqsa 
Intifada are a clear indication that successful tactical measures are not necessarily 
successful strategically.  There is little reason to assume that any of the tactics the Israelis 
have used will undermine the will of resistance fighters in the long run.  In order for 
tactical measures to be successful, there must also be a parallel strategy that addresses the 
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